WSOP-Circuit Atlantic City: Canada's Samuel Chartier Wins

Canadian bests field of 207 at WSOP Circuit-Atlantic City


You may not recongnize the names of the nine survivors at the World Series of Poker Circuit Main Event at Caesars Atlantic City, but that doesn't mean the field was weak. With one WSOP bracelet winner, the 2008 UltimateBet Aruba Poker Classic champion and more than half a dozen WSOP final tables among them, these nine competitors made up an extremely solid field. When the dust finally settled 8 hours later on the final table, Canadian Samuel Chartier Defeated fellow Canadian John Nixon to claim the gold championship ring, the WSOP Main Event entry package, and the $322,944 top prize.

While Alex Bolotin took the chip lead into the final table, it was Frank Vizza who stormed out of the gate early to grab the top spot onAlex Bolotin took the chip lead into the final table, but Frank Vizza who stormed out of the gate early grabbed the top spot on the leader board and add a couple of notches to his gunbelt along the way. His first victim was David Zeitlin, who busted in ninth place for $20,184. After Vizza raised from the cutoff, Zeitlin moved all in over the top with (6-Spades)(6-Clubs) from the big blind. Vizza snap-called with (A-Spades)(A-Hearts), and the board ran out (K-Spades)(Q-Clubs)(Q-Hearts)(9-Diamonds)(A-Diamonds) to send Zeitlin packing early.

Day 1 chip leader Chris Klodnicki was the next player to make a stand against Vizza's aggression, and again it was a battle of the pocket pairs. After raising with no opposition for several hands in a row, Vizza found an opponent when Klodnicki shoved back into him with pocket jacks. Vizza once again had the goods, and snap-called with pocket kings. The board missed both players, and Vizza's kings held up as Klodnicki picked up $30,276 for eighth place.

After that early flurry of big confrontations, play slowed significantly as the competitors were content to pick their spots. Jason Young picked his spot in a hand against eventual champion Samuel Chartier when he raised preflop with (J-Clubs)(J-Spades). Chartier was the lone caller, and he then moved all in on the (8-Clubs)(4-Clubs)(3-Hearts) flop. Young quickly called with his overpair, as Chartier showed (K-Clubs)(Q-Clubs) for overcards and the flush draw. The (7-Clubs) peeled off right away on the turn, and Young was drawing dead. As the meaningless (5-Hearts) hit the river, Young headed to the cage to collect his seventh-place money ($40,368).

Matt Brady was eliminated in sixth place ($50,460) by Chartier, but it was Frank Vizza who did the damage. Vizza three-bet John Nixon from the button, and Brady moved all in over the top from the big blind. Nixon decided discretion was the better part of valor, and Vizza made the easy call with (K-Clubs)(K-Diamonds). Brady's (10-Spades)(10-Diamonds) needed help, but none came on the (A-Spades)(J-Diamonds)(4-Spades)(3-Hearts)(4-Clubs) board. After doubling up Vizza, Brady's stack was on life support. Just a couple of hands later, Chartier pulled the plug when he called Brady's all-in with (3-Hearts)(3-Spades). Brady's (8-Hearts)(8-Clubs) looked good on the (A-Spades)(J-Hearts)(K-Spades) flop, but the (10-Spades) turn gave Chartier more outs to work with. The prescient Brady said, "You got the spade," as he looked at Chartier's hand, and as if called for, the (2-Spades) landed on the river to give Chartier the four-flush and show Brady the exit.

Alex Bolotin came into the final table as the big stack, but never really got his game on track in the final day of the event. In his last hand, he open-shoved with (K-Hearts)(3-Clubs), and big stack Frank Vizza was the lone caller, showing (A-Spades)(Q-Hearts). Bolotin fell further behind on the (Q-Spades)(6-Hearts)(8-Hearts) flop. He picked up a pair on the turn when the (3-Diamonds) fell, giving him a few outs to work with. The (10-Hearts) river wasn't one of them, and Bolotin was done in fifth place ($60,552).

Michael Michnik exited in fourth ($70,644) in a rough hand against Samuel Chartier. After raising preflop with (A-Spades)(J-Clubs), Michnik moved all in over the top of Chartier's three-bet. Chartier quickly called, and showed (A-Clubs)(J-Spades) for the same hand. Chartier was free rolling after the (5-Spades)(6-Clubs)(8-Clubs) flop, and the (Q-Clubs) turn put Michnik in danger of elimination. As the (9-Clubs) landed on the river to give Chartier the flush, Michnik could only look on in disgust, then shake his opponents' hands as he headed to the exit.

There was no elimination in the biggest pot of the night, but it set the stage for the eventual winner of the gold ring. With blinds at 16,000/32,000 and a 4,000 ante, Frank Vizza raised preflop to 100,000. Samuel Chartier re-raised to 246,000, and Vizza called. The flop came down (8-Hearts)(5-Clubs)(6-Spades), and Chartier led out for 200,000. Vizza sat for a moment before raising to 700,000. After a couple minutes' consideration, Chartier moved all in over the top. This prompted Vizza to go deep in the tank, contemplating every possible outcome of the hand. Finally after more than five minutes in thought, Vizza folded, giving up his chip lead to Chartier just before the dinner break.

Things went no better for Vizza after dinner, as he quickly doubled up John Nixon on the second hand back from break. With just a fraction of his former stack, Vizza then called a preflop raise from John Nixon a few hands later to put his tournament life on the line. Vizza held a slight lead on the flop, as his (A-Hearts)(2-Spades) led Nixon's (K-Spades)(J-Diamonds) on the (8-Spades)(4-Clubs)(Q-Hearts) board. The (9-Spades) on the turn gave Nixon more outs, and the (J-Spades) on the river gave him the pair to send Vizza to the rail in third place ($90,828).

After their collective decimation of Frank Vizza's stack, Samuel Chartier and John Nixon settled in for heads-up play with Chartier holding the chip lead. It only took a few hands to decide the title, with Nixon unable to overcome Chartier's lead. In the final hand, Nixon raised preflop from the button, then moved all in over the top of Chartier's re-raise. Chartier quickly called and showed (A-Hearts)(J-Clubs), dominating Nixon's (A-Diamonds)(10-Spades). Chartier took a commanding lead on the (A-Spades)(J-Diamonds)(5-Hearts) flop, making two pair to Nixon's one. The (5-Diamonds) on the turn gave additional outs to chop, but the (10-Clubs) on the river was no help for Nixon, who earned $177,619 for his runner-up performance.

Samuel Chartier trumped a field of 207 opponents to claim his $322,944 top prize, plus an entry into the WSOP Main Event and the gold Circuit Championship ring. He bested a field that included some of the biggest names in poker, and prevailed over a tough final table to do it.

Private Tourney on Poker Stars

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Flush draws-the right way to play them.

Strategies for flush draws with a three-suited flop are much different than with a two suited flop. Strategies for two-suited flops can vary depending on other qualities of the flop. For example, the flop could also have a pair or connected cards. Flush draws raise in value when you add other elements to your hand such as straight draws, pairs, or overcards.
Let’s take a look at odds. Flush draws are just about 2 to 1 against improving by the river, but this could improve depending on the pair and straight possibilities of your hand. Add a gut-shot straight draw or an over-card and you are approximately 1.2 to 1 against improving. An open-ended straight and flush draw is .9 to 1. Add overcards to any of these and you have even better odds. As you can see, at worst, you are 2 to 1 against improving. This is even better when you add other elements to your hand.


Two-Suited

Let’s look first at flush draws when the flop is two-suited. When the flop is two suited, you are almost always getting sufficient odds to draw to the flush with these few exceptions:
• You are heads up in a small pot and don’t have a pair, and you are convinced your opponent has a pair higher than your two cards.
• There is a pair on the flop and a decent chance an opponent holds three of a kind. With a pair on the flop, it is much easier for someone to spike a full house to beat your flush; however, you can still draw out sometimes depending on the action and size of the pot.
• The action is so strong on the flop that your small flush draw could be drawing dead to a better flush draw. Be careful in getting into a betting war with a drawing hand that could be runner-up. The worse case scenario is when someone has a set and the other player has a nut flush draw with a top pair. These two players could be raising a lot and you would be stuck in the middle doing nothing but giving away your money. Play your draws, but be prepared to back off when the action gets too heavy on the flop. Flush draws are very strong. Even with the exceptions listed above, there may be times when drawing to the flush is still OK. For example, if the pot is large with several opponents, sometimes you can draw to the nut flush when there is a pair on the flop. Let’s look first at draws when there are three or more players in the hand. In these cases, you usually prefer to keep as many players in the hand as possible to help improve your odds: therefore, you should normally check when acting first, especially when there is a preflop raiser. You do not want to bet and then get raised immediately behind you, causing the other players to fold. If you were the preflop raiser, go ahead and bet out as usual. If some-one bets into you and there are still opponents to act behind you, normally just call to allow the other players to come in cheaply.


There is one exception in trying to keep as many opponents in the hand as possible with your flush draws. This occurs when there is a large pot and you have other elements to your hand that could help you win the pot. For example, if you have an ace overcard with a weak kicker and you believe a raise could get an opponent to fold a hand like Ax, you might raise to give yourself a better chance at winning a large pot. Generally, deciding whether to drive out players or keep them in the hand is a function of the size of the pot and how strong your secondary draws are.
If there are already several callers, raising is an option. Raising increases the size of the pot when you are getting good pot odds on the bet. If you are in late position, you also might be able to get a free card on the turn. Check-raising is an option when there are several callers in the hand, but you must act first on the turn thereby eliminating your chance at a free card. Check-raising in these situations is much better when you have other strong elements to your hand, such as a pair, two overcards, or a straight draw.


Against one or two opponents (and sometimes even three), it is possible to win the pot on a semi-bluff. Whenever you feel there is a chance to win the pot outright by betting or raising, you should usually do so. Advanced Concept; Whenever you have a strong drawing hand, you should bet or raise if you feel you have a decent chance to win the pot outright, especially against one or two opponents. Semi-bluffs with flush draws are very strong plays. You could win the pot immediately, and if you don’t, you still have a good chance at winning the pot on your draw; therefore, if you act first against one or two opponents, usually bet out if you feel you have some chance that your opponents will fold. Otherwise, usually it is better to just check and call. If someone bets and you feel there is some chance he is bluffing, semi-bluff raising can be correct. If you act last and no one has bet, you should almost always bet out. If both players have already bet, you must decide whether to raise or just call. Raising is an option if you could receive a free card. Otherwise, only raise when youhave other elements to your hand.

There are times when reraising with flush draws is correct. For example, a hand like Q♦ J♦ with a flop of T♣ 9♦ 5♦ gives you a super strong hand. You have a good flush draw for nine outs, an open-ended straight draw for an additional six outs, and finally a queen or jack may also give you the winner for an additional six outs. You will hit a straight or flush 54% of the time and an overcard an additional 24% of the time! Heads up you should almost always reraise with hands such as these.
Against several opponents, always reraise unless you prefer to just call rather than drive out opponents who might have to pay two bets. With small pots, you prefer there to be several opponents with some trashy hands in the pot, keep them hoping!

Changing gears-Definition and practice

Playing well in marginal situations is how we make our money at shorthand NL poker. Unlike full ring were our hand selection dictates that we will be in less marginal situations, good intelligent play with 6 or less players at the table requires: a wide opening range in position, a wide 3-bet range, and an understanding that your opponents are in the same situation. The past articles I have written up to this point have covered dealing with specific marginal situations whether its 3-betting light, dealing with continuation bet playback, or even making a timely double barrel/big bluff. While it’s important to talk about each of these concepts individually, each of these concepts has to be put together into a total game plan or approach. This is not to say that we don’t need to constantly adjust against our opponents but that solid aggressive poker is how we make our money and a similar methodology is required against all opponents.



Playing a well rounded poker game is similar to being a good football team. Good football teams are aggressive, they balance the run and pass, and they don’t make big mistakes. However, often a situation will occur where one team "matches up well" with another. For example, the Atlanta Falcons base their offense on running the ball with their running back and Michael Vick even in situations where he could be passing. The problem with this approach is defenses defend against quarterback and running back runs in the same fashion. They place more defenders "in the box" have 1-2 of them specifically spy the quarterback. However, on a running play these defenders are already in position even if they are spying on the quarterback! Although this is a massive simplification of the back and forth play calling that takes place in football games it helps us understand a huge leak that many players have playing poker.





You can’t be the team that calls too many offensive plays that are weak to the same defensive configuration. For example, if you’re an aggressive preflop player and open a lot of hands in position and are overly aggressive after the flop you will lose out on a lot of money. Why? Your opponents are starting the hand in a better situation; they will hit the flop much more often and are playing hands that don’t even need to hit flops a higher percentage of the time then you. In order to adjust you have to let go of post flop pots in certain situations that you normally would make a bluff because you are more likely to be called down. Your aggression hits a wall because they are using a similar strategy to deal with your aggression before and after the flop. If you are a player who 3-bets constantly, opponents will not give you credit and often make big plays on innocuous boards after the flop. Again your aggression style before and after the flop are similar.





In order to force your opponents to make difficult decisions and attempt to limit the ones you yourself have to make you need to mix up your game and understand your table image. I personally have two distinct preflop styles that I switch between whenever I believe my table image calls for it. The first is a 3-betting TAG, while in this style I don’t open many hands but I never cold call before the flop unless there is multi-way action and I create a lot of 3-bet pots. The other is a cold calling LAG, where I open lots of pots; try to outplay my opponent after the flop but almost never 3-bet preflop and only then with good hands. The reason for switching between these play styles is simple they are a different kind of offense and require a different mindset and defense to defend against. When you are aggressive with 3-bets preflop players respond with post flop plays in reraised pots and light 4-bets (occasionally). Now imagine if I had just switched styles so I am only 3-betting with good hands, often opponents will be making huge mistakes postflop because they believe my preflop range is wide, even though I have just tightened it. On the other hand if an opponent has not seen how I play in a cold called pot they aren’t going to respond well to post flop aggression even if its from a good hand. While players may attack a LAGish style with their own preflop aggression (lots of 3-bets), immediately when I switch back to a tight style they get into a lot of trouble preflop because I am only opening a higher quality of hands.





Now this may seem like mombojumbo. And I think to a lot of my readers it will be. Most players don’t mix up their game so consciously or modify how they play in such a strict fashion. However, I find that running two totally different offenses ends up confusing opponents and often having them give me a wider range in situations where it isn’t profitable for them to do so. Instead of focusing on "switching gears" as a simple way to tighten up after you have made a bunch of raises in hands that didn’t get shown down I believe you need to modify your entire game in order to take advantage of the changes in your image. It’s not as simple as "I just won a lot of pots recently so now I can fold, get a good hand and get paid" each poker hand is an individual situation and they often require a different approach to maximize their EV. What I’m trying to say here is instead of allowing yourself to fall in with the rhythm of the game you purposely break out of the mold and play creativity. Bluffs often fail because we make them at the wrong times, because we are attempting to make a bluff that follows game rhythm. My answer to that is instead of making plays based on whether or not our image will allow it, we instead purposely change the way we play in a non rhythmic fashion.





Our job is to put our opponents in spots where they can’t run the same defense, where they can’t merely playback because it’s their time to win the pot. Although it’s important to give post flop respect where it’s due, not allowing what is obvious playback to be successful is key to your success.